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Abstract—Blockchain systems have received much attention
and promise to revolutionize many services. Yet, despite their
popularity, current blockchain systems exist in isolation, that is,
they cannot share information. While interoperability is crucial
for blockchain to reach widespread adoption, it is difficult
to achieve due to differences among existing blockchain tech-
nologies. This paper presents a technique to allow blockchain
interoperability. The core idea is to provide a primitive operation
to developers so that contracts and objects can switch from one
blockchain to another, without breaking consistency and violating
key blockchain properties. To validate our ideas, we implemented
our protocol in two popular blockchain clients that use the
Ethereum virtual machine. We discuss how to build applications
using the proposed protocol and show examples of applications
based on real use cases that can move across blockchains. To
analyze the system performance we use a real trace from one
of the most popular Ethereum applications and replay it in a
multi-blockchain environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain has gained much attention since the introduction
of Bitcoin [1], and several blockchain systems have been
developed thereafter [2]. Ideally a blockchain is a geographi-
cally replicated state machine that tolerates Byzantine failures.
Blocks in a blockchain contain transactions, usually crypto-
graphically signed by a user. In a permissionless blockchain
system, blocks are produced by miners, each block crypto-
graphically linked to the previous one, forming a chain. To
produce a valid block, miners must solve a cryptographic
puzzle. The miner whose valid block makes it to the canonical
chain receives the block reward. In a permissioned blockchain
system, miners can be in a consortium where they behave
similarly to members of traditional BFT algorithms, such as
PBFT [3], in which case they are named “validators”.
As blockchain technology reaches mainstream use, it starts
to face issues typical of more mature distributed systems
technologies. Two formidable challenges are scalability and
interoperability. Scalability has been early recognized as a
major limitation of existing blockchain systems. And several
attempts have been made to improve blockchain performance
(e.g., [4], [5], [6]). In general, distributed systems scale perfor-
mance by partitioning (sharding) the application state [7]. If
the partitioning is such that most application requests can be
executed within a single partition, and the load among parti-
tions is balanced, then performance scales with the number of
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partitions. Unfortunately, few applications can be optimally
partitioned (i.e., all requests fall within a single partition
and load is balanced among partitions). As a result, most
partitioned systems must handle requests that span multiple
partitions. In the particular case of blockchain, it has been
shown that even with a nearly perfect partitioning of the data,
the existing Ethereum workload would result in a substantial
number of cross-partition transactions [8]. The Achilles heel
of scalable blockchain systems is their ability to handle cross-
partition transactions.
Interoperability has been in the blockchain wishlist for
some time. Yet, to date, no general mechanism has been
proposed to share information across different blockchains.
Inter blockchain communication (IBC) is necessary for mul-
tiple blockchains to co-exist in a heterogeneous way. For
blockchains to interact with each other, some form of synchro-
nization is required across blockchains. There are two main
classes of solutions to handle transactions that involve multiple
blockchains: (a) coordinating the blockchains involved in the
execution of the transaction, in a scheme akin to atomic
commitment [9], [10]; and (b) moving the state required by
the transaction to a single target blockchain and then executing
the transaction locally at the target blockchain.
Scalability and interoperability are different requirements.
However, they can be addressed with a common mechanism:
a move operation that allows accounts and arbitrary computa-
tion (i.e., smart contracts) to consistently migrate from one
blockchain to another. In brief, the move operation works
in two steps. In the first step, it locks a smart contract in
the source blockchain. Once locked, the smart contract state
cannot be changed in the source blockchain. A second step
recreates the smart contract in the target blockchain in a
provably correct way.
We have implemented the Move protocol in Ethereum [11]
and Burrow [12], two popular blockchains, and evaluated it
with different applications. Even though smart contracts with
arbitrary code can move across blockchains consistently, we
argue that developers should think of smart contracts as first-
class objects that can move within blockchains. For example, if
a smart contract maintains a set of users in its state, moving it
will likely be inefficient because a possibly large state with all
users has to move together with the smart contract. If, instead,
the smart contract creates a new smart contract per user, then
the move can happen more efficiently, at the granularity of
individual users.
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In summary, the paper makes the following contributions:
• We introduce the move operation, which allows pro-
grammable blockchains to interoperate, and provide a
programming model for smart contract developers.
• We extend Solidity, a popular smart contract language, to
include operations that help developers to program smart
contracts that can move within blockchains. We propose
an interface for token smart contracts and evaluate their
usage.
• We modify two different blockchain clients and exten-
sively analyze how the system behaves with different
applications based on both synthetic and real workloads.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
presents the background necessary to understand the move op-
eration, detailed in Section III. Section IV explains how to use
the move operation to implement interoperability and sharding.
In Section V, we describe two different applications that can
benefit from the move operation, and from Section VI to VIII
we report on the experimental evaluation. Finally, Section IX
surveys previous work and in Section X concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A blockchain system is a distributed ledger, that is, an
append-only log of transactions. Clients submit transactions
to the blockchain, which are appended to the log and
then executed. Geographically distributed nodes intercon-
nected through a peer-to-peer overlay network implements
the append-only log abstraction. Clients and nodes may be
honest, in which case they follow their protocol specification,
or malicious, in which case nothing can be assumed about their
behavior. The blockchain system behaves correctly as long as
a fraction of the nodes, typically more than two-thirds, are
honest.
The append-only log is structured as a linked-list of blocks,
each block divided between a header and a body. The header
contains, among other information, a cryptographic link to
the previous block. The body contains a list of transactions,
each transaction cryptographically signed by the client that
submitted it. The way the linked list of blocks is built leads
to two categories of blockchain systems. In the first category,
there are blockchain systems (e.g., Bitcoin [1], Ethereum [11])
that allow the chain of blocks to momentarily fork, that is,
multiple blocks may be linked to a block. In the second
category, there are blockchain systems that ensure a total
order on linked blocks (e.g., Burrow/Tendermint [12]). These
systems require nodes to agree on the next block to be
appended to the chain, and therefore solve consensus. The
techniques proposed in this paper apply to both categories.
Blockchain systems can also be distinguished by the nature
of the operations they support. Some blockchain systems limit
transactions to distributed asset transfer, while others allow
transactions to perform arbitrary computation (e.g., Ethereum,
HyperLedger Fabric [13], Cosmos/Tendermint [14]). In this
paper, we assume blockchain systems in the second category.
In our model, we make a distinction between two types of data
objects: accounts which hold state and have a cryptographi-
cally derived unique identifier, and smart contracts, or for short
contracts. Smart contracts encapsulate executable code, which
can hold, read, and modify their own state and call other smart
contracts. Clients hold one asymmetric key-pair per account,
and every transaction originates from a client, who provides
proof of ownership of an account.
Blockchains can grow large in size and complexity. For
instance, Ethereum has over three terabytes of log at the mo-
ment and it can take several weeks to re-execute all appended
transactions. Clients with low storage or computational power
can succinctly prove the validity of an arbitrary piece of the
state [15] without re-executing the entire log, provided they
maintain and verify all the block headers.
Blockchain systems typically rely on a Merkle-tree or simi-
lar data structure to provide data integrity checks. For example,
Bitcoin uses a binary Merkle-tree [15], while Tendermint
uses a modified AVL tree [16]. For the sake of simplicity,
we call these structures “Merkle-trees”. Each block header
includes the root of a Merkle-tree (i.e., Merkle-root). Data
is encoded on the leaves of the Merkle-tree, and parent nodes
are labeled with the cryptographic hash of child nodes grouped
together, compacting the structure until a unique Merkle-root
is reached. The objective of such data structure is to provide a
computationally and spatially cheap way to prove the integrity
of leaves of the state without necessarily having all the state.
Merkle-trees allow for a peer to hold only block headers and
forego downloading all the blockchain state. Peers can ask for
a proved piece of partial state (Merkle-proof) at a specific
block height from peers that have the state at the requested
block height or happen to have the same Merkle-proof. The
information provided by these peers can be checked with the
Merkle-root stored in the trusted block header. We denote the
unique path of a valid Merkle-proof from object v to Merkle-
root m as {v} 7→ m. The leafs v and nodes h ∈ ({v} 7→ m)
needed to reconstruct the proof must be given to verify the
validity of the proof. The verification of Merkle-proofs can be
done optimally in logarithmic time and space on the number
of nodes of the tree [15].
Figure 1 illustrates how Merkle-proofs can prune parts of
the tree logarithmically. Blocks from b0 to bn are shown linked
together in the top. From block b1 we see the Merkle-proof
for {v} 7→ m. Given a hash function H , m is b1’s Merkle-root
composed by h0 and h1 hashes. In the figure we see the result
of asking for the Merkle-proof of v, anyone can compute the
Merkle-root of this proof and accept it only if it is equal to
the trusted Merkle-root m stored in b1. Observe that only v
and hatched nodes h0 and h3 are needed to verify m.
III. THE MOVE PROTOCOL
We propose a new method to move a contract from one
blockchain to another. In the following, we state the assump-
tions needed to support the move operation (Section III-A),
introduce the general idea (Section III-B), present the move
operation in detail (Section III-C), and discuss extensions to
the basic protocol (Section III-F).
b0 b1 b2 bn. . .
m : H(h0, h1)
h1 : H(h2, h3)h0
h3h2 : H(v)
v
Fig. 1: Merkle-proof example, h0, h3 ∈ ({v} 7→ m).
A. Assumptions
We make the assumptions listed next in order for
blockchains to support the move operation. Although these
assumptions are not strictly necessary to move objects across
blockchains, they simplify the Move protocol.
In particular, we assume that blockchains must:
(a) support smart contracts (i.e., arbitrary computation);
(b) use the same execution environment (i.e., virtual machine);
and
(c) provide a succinct way to prove state variables (e.g., using
a Merkle-tree).
Supporting smart contracts that can execute arbitrary com-
putation allows us to investigate more complex and generic use
cases for the protocol. When moved to the target blockchain,
we assume that smart contracts can execute the same opcode
instructions they executed in the source blockchain, i.e., they
use the same execution environment. This simplifies how
communicating blockchains are capable to understand each
other.
Clients can have information about the Merkle-root of any
other blockchain by downloading the correspondent block
header. Clients can listen to headers from multiple blockchains
all at once. Block headers have a constant size of usually
hundreds of bytes and are on average a small fraction of
block bodies. For example, in Ethereum block headers are
around 2% of the block’s body. Moreover, blockchains willing
to support the Move protocol must agree on certain configured
parameters discussed in Section IV-A.
B. Overview
The state of a contract is presumably indivisible and must
reside as a whole in a blockchain. Accounts and smart con-
tracts are restrained to live in a single blockchain at a time.
Therefore, we must ensure that if a contract moves from one
blockchain (source) to another (target), it will no longer be
“active” in the source blockchain. When the contract becomes
active in the target blockchain, its state must be identical to its
state when it became inactive in the source blockchain. This
implies that the move operation involving two blockchains
must be atomic.
One way to implement an atomic Move operation is to resort
to the well-known two-phase commit (2PC) protocol [9], or
one of its more resilient variations (e.g., [17]). We refrain
from using a 2PC-like Move protocol since it would introduce
expensive coordination between the involved blockchains (e.g.,
members of each blockchain would have to exchange votes in
a reliable manner). Instead, we use a two-step approach that
divides the move operation into two transactions, Move1 and
Move2. + In Move1, the state of a smart contract is “locked”
in the source blockchain, after which it is guaranteed not to
be changed—although transactions can still read the contents
of the locked smart contract. In Move2, the smart contract
is reconstructed in the target blockchain, after which it can
be safely used. To avoid simple attack vectors, the Move2
transaction is only successful at the target blockchain if it
contains a proof that the Move1 transaction was successfully
executed at the source blockchain.
This two-step approach reduces coordination between the
source and the destination blockchains, but it complicates
atomicity. For example, the move of a contract can remain
unfinished if the client fails after submitting the Move1
transaction and before it submits the corresponding Move2
transaction. To account for such cases, we allow any client to
execute the Move2 transaction, and thereby complete a possi-
bly unfinished Move operation. In the normal case, however,
we expect the same client to execute both transactions.
C. The Move protocol in detail
Algorithm 1 details the move operation of contract c from
blockchain Bi to Bj . We add a new field to a contract state,
referred to as Lc, to Lc represent the blockchain identifier the
smart contract c currently resides in. At low level, assigning
a new value to Lc in Move1 is implemented with a new
EVM opcode, OP MOVE. The OP MOVE opcode takes as
argument the target blockchain identifier the smart contract is
moving to (in this case Bj). When OP MOVE is executed
in c, it changes Lc to Bj , and by consequence blocks the
contract state at Bi. Any transactions that try to alter the state
of blocked contract c in Bi will be aborted.
Move2 assumes the existence of two boolean functions, VS
and VP . VS(B,m) returns true if m is a valid Merkle-root in
the blockchain B. VP (V 7→ m) returns true if the state V of
c is proved by V 7→ m. The smart contract code and other
blockchain specific variables (e.g., the amount of currency held
by the smart contract) are omitted in the algorithm but still
need to be proved by V 7→ m. Notice that before submitting
a Move2 transaction for contract c, the client must acquire the
proof V 7→ m at the source blockchain (discussed later).
The Move1 and Move2 transactions allow application de-
velopers to execute special routines when a contract is moved.
We illustrate the use of this functionality in the next section.
Algorithm 1 The operations.
1: procedure MOVE1(c, Bj ) . Move c in Bi to Bj , executed at Bi
2: moveTo(·) . Execute custom function
3: Lc ← Bj . Block contract c in Bi
4: procedure MOVE2(c, V 7→ m) . Complete move of c, execute at Bj
5: if Lc 6= Bj then . Is c being moved to the wrong blockchain?
6: return abort
7: if VS(Bi,m) = false then . Invalid Merkle-root
8: return abort
9: if VP (V 7→ m) = false then . Invalid proof
10: return abort
11: for all v ∈ V do
12: Call SSTORE(v.key v.value) . Recreate storage in Bj
13: return moveF inish(·) . Execute custom function
address owner;
uint movedAt;
function moveTo(uint _blockchainId) public {
require(owner == msg.sender);
require(now - movedAt >= 3 days);
}
function moveFinish() public {
movedAt = now;
}
Listing 1: Excerpt of a movable contract in Solidity.
D. A concrete implementation
We have integrated the Move operation in the Solidity
programming language [18]. In our prototype, smart contract
developers must implement two functions to allow contracts
to move, moveTo(·) and moveFinish(·) (see Algorithm 1).
This provides the application developer a great deal of flexi-
bility. For example, in Listing 1 we have an excerpt of Solidity
code that in few lines ensures that only the contract’s owner is
allowed to move the contract and the contract must remain at
least three days in the target blockchain before moved again.
E. Preventing replay attacks
If a client executes transaction Tmove1 at blockchain Bi to
move contract c to Bj , any client can craft a special transaction
Tmove2 to be executed in blockchain Bj that reconstructs the
state of c in Bj . In Tmove2 the client appends the state of
contract c encoded as V in the Merkle-proof V 7→ m. Target
blockchain Bj is responsible for verifying that m is accepted
by the blockchain as a valid Merkle-root of Bi. Nodes in
blockchain Bj verify the correctness of c’s state by verifying
V 7→ m and Bi’s state root hash. If the proofs are valid, c’s
state can be safely reconstructed in Bj .
Additional measures should be taken to prevent replay
attacks. The attack consists in a (malicious) client crafting
a Tmove2 transaction that uses old state of contract c. The
replayed transaction would obviously lead to inconsistencies as
transactions that followed the first (and thus legitimate) Move2
transaction would be lost. One remedy would be to have
nodes store the contract’s nonce, a monotonically increasing
number that is increased every time the contract is invoked.
For instance, in Figure 2 a contract is moved from B1 to B2
(transactions Tmove1 and Tmove2, respectively) and afterwards
Client1
B1
B2
Tmove1(B2)
Tmove2Client2 Tmove1’(B1)
Tmove2’
Tmove2
nonce=1
nonce=2 nonce=3
nonce=4
1 > 3
Fig. 2: Preventing replay on stale data.
back to B1 (transactions Tmove1′ and Tmove2′ ). It starts with
nonce (n) equal to zero and as soon as Tmove2 is executed in
B2 it increments the nonce by one. Afterwards Tmove1′(B1)
completes in B2 and changes the nonce to three. When client2
tries to replay transaction Tmove2, the contract’s nonce is one
which is less than what was previously seen by B2 and the
transaction aborts.
F. Handling currencies
Most cryptocurrencies rely on an internal currency for gen-
erating incentives to maintain the system (e.g., paying miners
and transaction fees). In some cases, the currency is the main
usage of the system (e.g., Bitcoin). It is important therefore to
have a way of transferring this part of the system state from
one blockchain to another. As it turns out, we can devise a sim-
ple mechanism that uses our protocol to accomplish the feat.
It suffices for smart contracts to be allowed to hold currency
in their state. We can then implement smart contract “relays”
that can transfer currency from blockchains by creating a token
in the target blockchain that is provably locked in the source
blockchain, similar to Pegged Side Chains [19]. Currencies can
be unlocked when contracts return to the original blockchain.
Assume for example that we would like to transfer e units
of currency from client1 to client2, from blockchain Bi to
blockchain Bj . We assume the existence of contract c in Bi,
that when called by client client1 with input Bj , client2 and
value associated e creates a contract r that has e units of
currency and lets client2 withdraw e from its state (i.e., it
executes Move1(Bj) on creation). The client2 can call Tmove2
on r effectively moving it to Bj where the funds would be
available as a Bi’s token in Bj .
In Figure 3, we can see an example where a client success-
fully transfers a currency token from blockchain B1 to a token
representation in blockchain B2. Contract c’s function create
is called with e units of B1’s associated currency with Tcreate.
The transaction creates contract r with e units of currency,
seen in the figure as “$”, afterwards the same function calls
r’s moveTo(B2) changing r’s Lc to B2. The newly created
contract has functions to generate tokens which are proved to
be backed by e in B1. The client2 waits for the transaction
inclusion in B1 and sends transaction Tmove2 to B2, proving
Client1
B1
B2
Tcreate(B2,e,C2)
c
$:e
Lc:B2
Tmove2Client2
$:e
Lc:B2
proof
Tmint
r
r
Fig. 3: Move operation example.
that r was moved to B2. After transaction Tmove2 is included
in B2, client2 calls transaction Tmint which executes code in
r creating tokens in B2 that represent the locked coins in B1.
G. Additional details
a) Account identifiers: Although each blockchain main-
tains its own set of accounts, its identifier can be the same
if the interacting blockchains use the same rule to derive
such identifiers. Consequently, clients could use the same
cryptographic keys to use accounts in different blockchains.
It becomes essential to incorporate the blockchain’s identifi-
cation to functions that compute contract addresses to ensure a
unique system-wide contract identification to avoid collisions
in contract identifiers.
b) Finding contracts: Lc can only have two logical
states: either in the current blockchain or transferred (exe-
cuted Move1), and if moveTo(·) and moveFinish(·) are
implemented correctly, it can always go back to the first state
with Move2. A client who does not know where contract c is
located can use Lc to track the contract’s location every time
it moves.
c) Stale data: Every time a contract is moved it leaves
behind stale state on the original blockchain, which could be
garbage collected, paying attention to guard against the attack
previously described. Designing fee incentives to clean the
state is left as future work.
IV. APPLICATIONS
The Move protocol can be used by blockchains to imple-
ment two important blockchain concepts: interoperability and
sharding. Interoperability and sharding are related concepts
that have increased in importance as blockchain technology
matures.
A. Interoperability
Blockchains coexist nowadays with different transaction
designs, cryptographic features, and trust assumptions in a
heterogeneous environment. Interoperability provides a way to
offload transactions from one blockchain to another, unleash-
ing the potential to scale different applications and experiment
with different combinations of blockchains.
Interoperability in permissionless systems is challenging
mainly because forks can occur since block propagation time
is unbounded [20], which invalidates transactions that build
on the losing side of the fork. A way for systems proposing
interoperability [19], [21], [22] to interact with permissionless
blockchains is by introducing a parameter p that specifies the
minimum number of blocks that a transaction’s block should
be behind the blockchain’s head for it to be accepted by the
other blockchain. The parameter can be configured according
to each blockchain involved in the interoperability protocol.
Miners or validators of blockchains willing to interoperate
should maintain a light client that validates merkle-roots of
other blockchains, proposals for this scheme are discussed in
Section IX.
B. Sharding
Sharding enables the blockchain state to be divided into
shards responsible for holding a certain portion of the state.
Sharding preserves some of the blockchain assumptions, but
there are clear trade-offs in security because the members
themselves have to be sharded. The way objects are assigned to
each shard plays an important role when sharding a blockchain
for scalability. For instance, if objects are randomly partitioned
into shards, most of the transactions will likely be cross-shard.
The rate of cross-shard transactions also increases with the
number of shards, and sharding the state while minimizing the
number of cross-shard transactions keeping the various shards
balanced is a hard problem [8].
To cope with changes in load it becomes essential to
incorporate a method to move state from shards, offloading
one shard in detriment of another. As shards get congested
and fees increase, users are tempted to move their contracts
to underused shards.
V. USE CASES
We implemented two applications for smart contracts and
show how they scale with the number of blockchains:
• SCoin: A token smart contract based on a popular
Ethereum token interface.
• ScalableKitties: A clone of CryptoKitties, a popular
Ethereum application where virtual cats can migrate and
reproduce in different shards.
A. SCoin
ERC20 [23] is a standard interface widely used in Ethereum
for token operations including token transfers. STokenI and
AccountI, defined in Listing 2, are interfaces that support
all ERC20 operations and allow for contracts to move from
one blockchain to another. The main idea of the interface is
to use one instance of AccountI per user account. Typical
ERC20 implementations hold token balances in a map data
structure, which multiple blockchains cannot share in our
contract STokenI {
function totalSupply() public view returns (uint);
function newAccount() public payable returns (AccountI, uint);
function newAccountFor(address _forAddr) public payable returns (AccountI, uint);
event CreatedAccount(address account, uint salt);
}
contract AccountI {
function balance() public view returns (uint);
function allowance(address _spender) public view returns (uint);
function transfer(AccountInterface _to, uint _tokens) public returns (bool);
function approve(address _spender, uint _tokens) public returns (bool);
function transferFrom(AccountInterface _to, uint _tokens) public returns (bool);
function debit(uint _tokens, bytes _proof) public returns (bool);
function moveTo(uint _shardId) public;
function moveFinish() public;
event Transfer(address _to, uint _tokens);
event Approval(address _spender, uint _tokens);
}
Listing 2: Scalable Token interfaces extending ERC20.
design since we do not allow for contracts to live in two or
more blockchains at the same time.
Once created, accounts can freely move from blockchain
to blockchain using the moveTo and moveFinish functions. It
is left to the developer to restrict or even define a policy for
moving accounts between blockchains.
To illustrate the STokenI interface, we implement SCoin,
a scalable token contract that implements STokenI. SCoin
creates instances of SAccount, which implements SAccountI.
The implementation of SCoin and most functions of SAccount
are straightforward and application-dependent. We focus next
on how to do safe transfers between one SAccount to another.
To execute a transaction that transfers e tokens from SAccount
A to B, contract A has to decrease e from its state (called by
transfer function) and B has to increase e. This is done by
calling the debit function in B. If contracts A and B are in
different blockchains, they have to be first moved to the same
blockchain to be able to call each other. Once both contracts
are in the same blockchain, how can A know that B is what
it claims to be? For instance, one could design a contract B
that, when debit is called, increases the contract’s tokens by
an arbitrary amount. A could ask its parent if B was created
by the same contract, but A’s parent contract might be in
a different blockchain. The interface does not specify how
contract A can be sure of contract B’s origin. It is up to the
developer to devise safeguards to prevent incorrect usage. The
key idea for SCoin is holding a proof in B that it was created
by the same contract that created A.
When we create an instance of SAccount in SCoin it uses a
monotonically increasing salt, stored in the instance state. The
salt is used to calculate the identifiers of both contracts using
the create2 opcode [24]. With A’s salt, B can attest that A was
created by the same contract that created B and vice-versa. To
execute a transfer from SAccount A to B, contract A attests
B’s origin, decrements its own balance and calls the function
debit(·) in B. Contract B agrees to debit its own account only
if A passes the same check, and A can safely add B’s fund
to its own balance. The checks of origin are done with one
inexpensive hash operation. In our implementation case, we
take advantage of the way contract identifiers are generated
in the EVM. A more generic method could be devised using
Merkle proofs with the same proposed interfaces.
B. ScalableKitties
ScalableKitties is a clone of CryptoKitties, a popular
Ethereum smart contract that was created in November 23th
2017 and until the writing of this paper had over four mil-
lion related transactions. During the apex of its popularity,
CryptoKitties congested the Ethereum network for several
days, accounting for over fifteen percent of all Ethereum
transactions [25]. In CryptoKitties cats are collectibles that
can be bred to generate more cats following a set of rules
(e.g., sibling cats cannot mate). Cats were first generated by
the contract’s owner. Both the initial and bred cats are sold in
an auction smart contract. The game was the first mainstream
application built on top of Ethereum, and some cats were sold
for more than a hundred thousand dollars at the time. The
contract is still actively used today.
ScalableKitties’s functions map one-to-one to the Cryp-
toKitties smart contract but for simplicity we discuss only the
functions that are related to the execution of cross-blockchain
transactions. Cats are created in two ways: either by having the
contract’s owner calling a function to generate “promotional”
cats or by breeding two cats to generate a third. Breeding is the
only operation that can generate cross-blockchain transactions
because bred cats can be in different blockchains and need
to be moved to the same one. Furthermore, if the owner of
cat A wants to breed A with B, it either needs to own both
cats or B’s owner has to permit B to be sired with A. In the
experiments in Section VII-A we replay transactions from the
CryptoKitties contract on the ScalableKitties contract.
VI. DEPLOYMENT
We modify Hyperledger Burrow [12] and Ethereum [26] to
implement the protocol defined in Section III. The resulting
systems allow blockchains to communicate with each other
(IBC) or implement sharding. To validate our approach, we
conducted two types of experiments: we shard Burrow and
analyze how applications can scale performance, and make
smart contracts migrate from Ethereum to Burrow and vice-
versa to assess the performance and monetary costs of IBC.
Both Burrow and Ethereum implement the EVM model, where
each opcode executed by the smart contracts has a cost
modeled in gas, e.g., a sum between two integers costs 3 gas,
while creating a new smart contract costs 32000 gas [24].
Burrow uses Tendermint for consensus, which by design
introduces the application’s Merkle-root from block n in block
n + 1, but in Burrow the state of block n is saved only in
block n + 1, therefore there is a need to wait for two blocks
to prove the transaction inclusion required by Move2. For
the experiments we set p (defined in Section IV-A) equal to
two blocks in Burrow, since clients have no option other to
wait for two blocks to get the proof of inclusion of a Move1
transaction. For Ethereum we set p to six blocks.
Tendermint is configured to wait for five seconds between
each consecutive block, the observed latency being slightly
higher than this. Ethereum is configured to wait 15 seconds,
which is similar to Ethereum’s main public network.
All experiments were conducted using a heterogeneous clus-
ter in a local area network with simulated latencies between
nodes based on the values published in [27], where the authors
evaluate nodes in 14 regions in four continents on Amazon
data centers. We emulate this environment in the cluster and
randomly allocate nodes to regions.
VII. SHARDING EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the Move protocol using the two applications
described in Section V. The objective is to show how the
capacity to move smart contracts can significantly improve the
performance of the applications. In all sharding experiments,
one node hosts all clients and maintains one connection per
shard to broadcast the client’s transactions. We decided to run
one validator in each node and 10 validators per shard due to a
limitation of our cluster size, comprised of 80 computers, each
one with an eight-core Intel Xeon L5420 processor working at
2.5GHz, 8Gb of memory, SATA SSD disks and 1Gbps ethernet
card. With this configuration we can run a maximum of 8
shards and we decided to run experiments with 1 (no sharding),
2, 4 and 8 shards. To decide which shard to send the contracts
to when needed, we use hash partitioning where the contract’s
shard is decided by the hash of the contract’s identification.
Using hash partitioning ensures a good balance among shards
but implies probably a higher cross-shard rate the more shards
there are. We do not focus our attention to examine different
partitioning techniques but we believe greater improvements
are possible by using different sharding methods [8].
A. ScalableKitties
In order to produce the data for experiments we scanned all
transactions involving the CryptoKitties contract deployed 1 in
1At address 0x06012c8cf97bead5deae237070f9587f8e7a266d
Tx1 Tx2
Tx3Tx4
c1 c2c3
Fig. 4: Dependency graph example
Ethereum since its inception.
Since every transaction from the original contract must
succeed in our implementation, we first construct a depen-
dency DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) of all the transactions
and execute them respecting their dependencies. By doing so
we are able to execute some of the transactions in parallel.
for instance, consider a client that owns cat c1 and wants
to breed its cat with another user’s cat c2. To execute this
transaction, the transaction graph of Figure 4 needs to be
respected. First cats c1 and c2 have to be created with Tx1
and Tx2, respectively, then c2’s owner agrees with the breeding
with Tx3 and finally Tx4 breeds c1 and c2, creating c3. Vertices
c1, c2, and c3 are pointers to transaction vertices that have
a dependency on c1, c2, and c3, respectively. Notice that
leaf transactions in the DAG can be executed in parallel, for
instance, Tx1 and Tx2 can be executed in parallel but Tx4 can
only execute when it becomes a leaf, i.e., both Tx1 and Tx3
finish.
We replay CryptoKitties transactions on ScalableKitties in a
sharded environment running multiple instances of the Burrow
client. We use the dependency DAG described previously
to replay transactions to the contract. Transactions that are
appended in a block (executed) are removed from the DAG.
Subsequent transactions that become leaves in the DAG are
submitted until a limit of 250 outstanding transactions is
reached. We pre-process the whole DAG in memory, broad-
casting the first transactions, updating the DAG, and possibly
sending other transactions whose dependencies are satisfied.
The process continues until the experiment is over. Increasing
the number of shards leads to an increase in the number of
cross-shard transactions, that in turn reduce the number of
leaves in the DAG since cross-shard transactions depend at
least on two transactions: Move1 and Move2.
Figure 5 (left) shows a nearly linear increase in the average
number of transactions per second as we increase the number
of shards, except when there are eight shards. The reason the
throughput with eight shards is lower than expected is that
there were not enough ready-to-run transactions in the depen-
dency graph, making the client wait for blocked transactions
to finish. This is better visualized in Figure 5 (right), where
vertical dashed lines mark the point when each one of the
eight shards had less outgoing transactions than established at
the beginning of the experiment.
To better understand how varying cross-shard transaction
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Fig. 5: ScalableKitties throughput for 2, 4 and 8 shards (left), and aggregated throughput over time for 8 shards (right).
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Fig. 6: Performance with varying number of shards and different cross-shard transaction rates.
rates can affect performance we conduct experiments in the
next section that confirm the performance gains obtained with
ScalableKitties.
B. SCoin
We now present results for the SCoin application defined in
Section V-A. In these experiments, we benchmark how well
the protocol can perform with a single application with varying
number of transactions that require cross-shard communication
(i.e., tokens transferred between different partitions). We try
to measure latency and throughput tradeoffs with a varying
number of cross-shard transactions.
Each client in the experiment tries to execute transfer
transactions in a closed-loop. If the transaction is cross-shard,
i.e., if a client is trying to transfer its token to an account that
resides in a different shard, the client first move its account
to the corresponding shard and then executes the transfer
transaction afterward in the destination shard. Similarly to
the previous experiment, we tune the number of clients in
the system to avoid a significant degradation of the average
latency for each client, thus caping each shard to 250 clients.
We experiment with different cross-shard transaction rates for
different shard numbers.
Figure 6 shows the aggregate throughput of the system
for a varying number of shards and different percentages of
cross-shard transactions. The one shard experiment is shown
in every cross-shard rate experiment as a reference. We can
see how performance degrades when increasing the number of
cross-shard transaction rates, but the throughput grows linearly
at different rates of cross-shard. For comparison, the previ-
ous experiment had on average 5.86%, 7.93%, 7.85% cross-
blockchain transaction rate for 2, 4 and 8 shards, respectively.
Any system that reserves part of its allocated resources to
process cross-shard transactions will have similar behavior,
due to cross-shard transactions occupying the resources that
otherwise would be used by single-shard transactions.
The average latency for clients does not change significantly
when increasing the number of shards, remaining at around
7 seconds for single-shard transactions and 34 seconds for
cross-shard transactions. Cross-shard transactions demand two
transactions for each move operation, plus waiting for two
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Fig. 7: Latency CDF for 4 shards experiment with 10% cross-shard transactions.
blocks to prove the contract’s state and one final transaction
to complete the operation, confirming the expected latency
of waiting for five blocks per cross-shard transaction. In
Figure 7 (right) we can see the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) for clients’ observed latencies in a scenario with four
shards and 10% cross-shard transactions rate. The aggregated
latency shows both single and cross-shard transactions and
we can see that, as expected, around 10% of the transactions
takes more than 30 seconds to complete. Differently from other
sharded systems (e.g., [28]) the protocol does not suffer from
a convoy effect [29], that is, cross-shard transactions do not
delay single-shard transactions.
1) Retries: In the previous experiments, to better control
the rate of cross-shard transactions, clients submit transactions
only if they know the contracts are not going to be moved
when the transaction is executed. To better model transactions
in the presence of conflicts we experiment with the SCoin
contract without any help from external sources. Two situa-
tions can make clients retry transactions: when performing a
single-shard transaction and the interacted contract is moved
to another shard or when performing a cross-shard transaction
and the called contract is moved to another shard. In the
experiment we make clients wait a random time corresponding
to the creation of 0 to 10 blocks if the transaction fails for any
of these reasons, this is done to prevent contracts moving back
and forth in an endless cycle.
Figure 7 (right) shows the ideal latency where no conflicts
exist, and Figure 7 (left) shows the latency when conflicts
can happen. A clear increase in latency is observed when
comparing both figures, but when retries can happen the
number of times the same transaction fails and has to retry
is highly skewed, for instance, 66% of the transactions that
retry, do it just once, and only 1% of these transactions are
retried more than three times.
VIII. IBC EXPERIMENTS
This section presents some experiments for inter-blockchain
communication (IBC) considering Burrow/Tendermint and
Ethereum. These experiments aim to measure the time and
gas (which translates to cryptocurrency costs) consumed for
operations with five different applications:
• SCoin: Transfer one token from one blockchain to another
and transfer the virtual currency to another account in the
target blockchain.
• ScalableKitties: Transfer one virtual cat from one
blockchain to another, breeds the cat with an existing cat
in the target blockchain and gives birth to another cat.
• State 1, State 10, State 100: Transfer the state containing
respectively 1, 10 and 100 32-byte state variables from
one blockchain to another.
These operations require moving their corresponding smart
contract from the source to the target blockchain, an operation
requiring two transactions (Move1 and Move2) and the wait
for p blocks in-between transactions. After that, further trans-
actions might need to be executed in the target blockchain.
In our examples: SCoin requires one further operation to
transfer the token to a contract in the target blockchain, while
ScalableKitties requires two transactions breed and giveBirth
to mate and produce a new virtual cat, respectively. The state
transfer experiments do not require any further transactions
for completion.
Figure 8 presents the time required to perform an operation
from Ethereum to Burrow and vice-versa. Unsurprisingly, the
time to perform a single transaction is bound to the latency
between consecutive blocks in each blockchain. To execute
Move2 from Ethereum to Burrow one is required to wait for
6 Ethereum blocks that translates to approximately 90 seconds
and ends up dominating the overall time for every operation.
A good way to analyze the impact of each operation in
the system’s performance is to measure the gas consumed by
each operation, the gas cost is expected to grow linearly with
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Fig. 9: Gas and monetary costs for five different inter-blockchain applications.
the size of the transferred smart contract state, since creating
or modifying state variables are expensive operations in the
EVM model. Figure 9 shows in the left y-axis the amount of
gas paid by each transaction. To better understand these costs,
in the right y-axis we present the same costs in US dollars,
considering the current average value of one gas as two Gwei
(2× 10−9 Eth) and one Eth as $144 (the price in the middle
of December of 2019).
The way Burrow and Ethereum calculate gas prices are dif-
ferent, besides the actual values per operation being different,
some operations pay no gas, e.g., in Ethereum, if one smart
contract or transaction creates a new smart contract it pays
an amount of gas per byte of the contract code that is being
created, while in Burrow no gas is paid per byte of code. In
both systems the code is immutable and stored in the state
Merkle-tree with the key based on the code’s hash.
In Figure 9, the vertical hatched bars represent the gas paid
by the creation of new contracts in Ethereum, every recreated
contract pays a constant gas based on the size of the moved
code. In the ScalableKitties application the giveBirth function
creates a new contract thus it pays for the gas again, for
SCoin and ScalableKitties the gas paid for the code creation
corresponds to around 70% of the total gas cost. We note
that it is possible to reduce significantly the Ethereum contract
creation costs if the contract code is already in the blockchain.
IX. RELATED WORK
Scaling blockchains is a hot topic for both industry and
academia, and many proposals have appeared in the last years
(e.g., [30], [31]). In this paper, we showed that scalability can
be achieved with a novel IBC protocol and sharding. A dif-
ferent approach to scaling blockchains is to shift computation
from the blockchain (on-chain) to the outside (off-chain). For
example, in the method proposed by TrueBit [32] most of the
computation is done off-chain. Cheating participants can be
caught by using an on-chain game in which anyone can prove
they misbehaved in logarithmic time. Another example of a
scaling solution is the lightning network [33], which works
on top of Bitcoin, and its Ethereum counterpart, Raiden [34].
Users of such systems create off-chain channels between them
in order to minimize on-chain transactions. The efficiency of
such systems is highly application-dependent.
Pegged Sidechains [19] focus on transferring assets between
proof-of-work blockchains. The idea is to lock assets in
one blockchain and recreate them in another blockchain by
providing a proof of such locking in the original blockchain.
The Move protocol generalizes Pegged Sidechains in several
aspects. First, it allows to transfer any state across blockchain
systems, not only assets; second, it applies to both proof-of-
stake and proof-of-work approaches; third, the Move protocol
shifts control to the application developer, who can develop
scalable applications with their own logic (e.g., introducing
load balancing mechanisms).
In HyperService [10], the authors create a new programming
language and system to make blockchain applications interop-
erable. HyperService orchestrates the execution of applications
that span multiple blockchains. We take a different approach:
a smart contract is executed in one blockchain, after the smart
contract dependencies are moved to the same blockchain.
In [35], atomic token swaps between multiple blockchains
are studied and proposed as a protocol that, similar to ours,
is done in two phases. As noted by the author, “atomic
cross-chain swap is an atomic cross-chain transaction, but
not vice-versa”. Our protocol could be used to implement
atomic swaps in a similar way as shown in III-F, although
a more efficient solution for performing token swaps with
more than two blockchains, combining our protocol with the
techniques proposed in [35] would be interesting future work.
In [36] the authors propose a solution for permissioned ledgers
where blockchains implement a common “relay” mechanism
for cross-blockchain transactions with smart contracts. The
protocol provides a great deal of flexibility but it requires smart
contract developers to have a deep understanding of the under-
lying cross-chain protocol. Without allowing contract’s state
to migrate, blockchain systems risk having their performance
limited by cross-blockchain transaction performance.
PolkaDot [21] aims to create a decentralized federation
of blockchains by allowing other blockchains (called para-
chains) to exist. Existing blockchains can be interfaced by
relay-chains, but no details are given on how the valida-
tion happens on existing blockchains. Similar to our work,
blockchains in PolkaDot need well-defined parameters so they
can interoperate, e.g., the number of blocks to wait to accept
the transaction as being final. Cosmos [22] also aims to
provide IBC by allowing multiple blockchains, called zones,
to communicate with each other. All Cosmos zones run the
Tendermint algorithm for consensus. One zone, called Cosmos
hub acts as a central communication interface for all other
zones. Interledger [37] is a proposed protocol for IBC that
tackles payments. To achieve safety and liveness, transactions
are either escrowed by notaries that run PBFT [3] or use
incentives on rational actors . The Interledger approach does
not integrate with existing blockchains and is constrained to
simple token transfers.
In Omniledger [5], the authors developed a protocol that
can process transactions across shards, called Atomix, built
on top of Bitcoin’s UTXO model. In Atomix, clients can
lock their input and are left with the burden of unlocking
them in case the transaction aborts. The authors briefly discuss
applying Atomix to smart contracts and suggest that Atomix is
suitable for scenarios where clients execute simple operations
and transactions do not conflict. Our approach exposes IBC
primitives to developers to give them more freedom to pro-
grammatically condition cross-blockchain operations. Similar
to Omniledger, Elastico [38] focus on Bitcoin’s UTXO model
and there is no need for cross-shard transactions because
outputs are assumed to be disjointedly distributed to shards.
Chainspace [39] builds on top of BFT-SMaRt [40], an
open source BFT consensus implementation written in Java.
One of the subsystems of Chainspace is S-BAC, a two-phase
commit protocol that deals with cross-shard transactions. In
our model, we expose sharding primitives that let developers
programmatically control the shard designation of smart con-
tracts, doing so simplifies the protocol and allow for a more
organic distribution of objects. Differently from S-BAC, our
protocol does not implement aborts and it is the developer’s
responsibility to avoid contracts stuck on the first phase of
the protocol. Chainspace provides helpful insights for further
works on sharding smart contracts that could be also applied in
the presented protocol, e.g., having shards checkpoints can be
beneficial to reduce the bandwidth and storage cost of moving
a contract. Similarly, the efficient shard state transfer protocol
described in [41] can alleviate this costs
A protocol with similar goals as ours has been proposed in
the Ethereum research forum concurrently with the develop-
ment of this work [42]. It describes a similar operation to
move the state from one shard to another, called yanking.
Other threads in the same forum further extend the proposed
idea, but until the writing of this paper, it remains a work in
progress tailored specifically for the Ethereum environment,
and constrained by its own design choices.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a practical protocol that can be used
to develop smart contracts that can move between different
blockchains. Our protocol enables smart contract developers to
create blockchain applications that interoperate and scale in an
ecosystem of multiple blockchains. We developed two appli-
cations for our protocol and extensively evaluated their perfor-
mance and tradeoffs. The simplicity of our protocol opens up
possibilities for further improvements, such as decentralized
load balancing smart contracts for sharded blockchains.
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